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Summary 
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 promised an overhaul of the coroners’ service, 
introducing much-needed efficiencies to benefit people bereaved by suicide and other 
sudden deaths. Central to these reforms was the introduction of a Chief Coroner to co-
ordinate the system and exercise wider public health responsibilities. The coalition 
government’s proposal to abolish the Chief Coroner’s office on grounds of cost, 
ignoring the potential efficiency gains, has arrested implementation of coronial 
reforms. Policy-makers are urged to use economic evaluation to identify the reforms’ 
most technically efficient components, bringing benefits to bereaved relatives, 
coroners’ staff, public sector budgets, and public health.   
 
Introduction 
Long-debated reforms of the 800-year-old coroner system in England and Wales 
became law with the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, heralding improvements to the 
efficiency of the coroners’ service, its capacity to support the bereaved people it 
serves, and its role in preventing future deaths 1;2. Clinicians had followed the 
legislative process closely, recognising the implications for patients and their relatives 
3-6. Coronial reform was agreed to be long overdue: resources were being wasted 
through unnecessary bureaucracy whilst funding inequities caused bottlenecks and 
delays. Central to the Act was the establishment of a new Chief Coroner, welcomed 
by the BMA, the public, and all political parties for its role in streamlining the service, 
settling costly disputes and improving accountability 4. The intention was for the 
Chief Coroner to lead on a raft of reforms, effecting cost savings, efficiencies, and 
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service improvements. Yet only months after the Act had been passed a change of 
government brought the announcement of a comprehensive spending review, placing 
most of the coroner reforms on hold 7. The Chief Coroner’s office was identified for 
abolition on grounds of expense. However this lacked any supporting cost analysis 
and ignored potential efficiency gains.   
The average in-patient or community psychiatrist will experience the suicide of at 
least one patient annually, and will be well aware of the distress caused to relatives, 
fellow patients, and team members by an inquest 8.  All clinicians will appreciate the 
public health and mental health benefits of the coronial reforms described here and 
their potential for wider cost savings, including those to the NHS. However these 
benefits need to be quantified explicitly if policy-makers are to be persuaded of their 
value. This article argues the general principle that responsible decision-making 
involves the most appropriate scientific analysis available, namely economic 
evaluation, and not solely the apparent subjectivity of politicians 9. With the future of 
the coroner reforms currently being debated in Parliament under the Public Bodies 
Bill there is still time for clinicians to contribute to the discussion by urging policy-
makers to conduct detailed economic evaluations of each reform. After many years of 
consultation this might finally bring about some proportion of the intended benefits to 
bereaved relatives and coronial staff, as well as to public health.   
 
Problems with the existing coroners’ service 
In England and Wales all violent, unnatural deaths, sudden deaths of unknown cause, 
and deaths in custody must be referred to a coroner: an independent judicial officer 
who may hold an inquiry to determine who has died, and how, when and where they 
came by their death. Each of these inquiries is conducted within a coroner’s 
jurisdiction, assisted by coroners’ officers, who also provide a family liaison role. In 
2009 46% of all deaths registered in England and Wales were referred to a coroner, 
for which inquests were opened on 31,000 10 . In 2010 the average time taken to 
complete an inquest was 27 weeks, with the worst-performing areas taking up to 43 
weeks 11. Since the 1970’s there has been a growing awareness of the difficulties 
faced by relatives in relation to coroner investigations and inquests 12 13, particularly 
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in cases of suicide 14;15. Qualitative research describes what can be a long and difficult 
process, involving frustrating administrative delays, a lack of consultation, confusing 
and intimidating experiences in the coroner’s court, and a sometimes unanticipated 
verdict 16 14 15.  
There are two reasons for these failures: a lack of accountability and devolution of 
funding. Whilst the independence of the coronial service is crucial, particularly where 
investigations expose governmental failings, coroners are not accountable for 
decisions. Under an archaic system of devolved funding salaries and resources are 
provided by the local authority, the police authority or both, resulting in pronounced 
geographical inequities 17. There are no service standards and no culture of mandatory 
training, whilst unnecessary bureaucracy contributes to backlogs. Coroners’ officers 
struggle with heavy caseloads which limit the degree of support they can offer 
bereaved families. Pilot schemes involving voluntary sector organisations like the 
Coroners’ Courts Support Service have sought to compensate for gaps in service, but 
the current economic climate threatens the sustainability of such arrangements 18.   
A 2003 independent review concluded that the coronial system was outdated, 
inconsistent and unsympathetic to families, proposing fundamental reforms led by a 
Chief Coroner 19. The Shipman Inquiry’s 2003 report also concluded that there was 
insufficient medical knowledge in the coroners’ system, a lack of leadership and 
training for coroners, and an inconsistent level of service for bereaved people 20. 
These recommendations prompted the Labour government to announce plans for 
coronial reform, published for consultation as part of the Coroners and Justice Bill 
2006. Reactions to the reforms were generally positive, despite reservations about 
financing. Plans to allow coroners to transfer cases more flexibly demonstrated clear 
efforts to reduce bureaucracy. However other opportunities for allocative efficiency 
had been missed, for example in ignoring the Shipman Inquiry’s recommendation to 
introduce central funding 20 . The wider costs and consequences of three key reforms 
are discussed below: the establishment of a Charter for the Bereaved, the creation of 
the post of Chief Coroner, and the introduction of a right of appeal.  
 
Key coronial reforms  
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1) Charter for the Bereaved: 
The Bill announced a Charter for the Bereaved setting out a range of service standards 
and consumer rights 21. These included material improvements to premises, for 
example a private room for relatives attending an inquest, as well as improved support 
and information for any bereaved person brought in contact with the coroner’s 
service. Information was to be provided on coronial procedures, arrangements for 
viewing the body, the rationale for a post-mortem, and where and when an inquest 
would be held. Coroners’ officers were given responsibility for providing this support, 
but without plans to expand their numbers, contrary to the Shipman Inquiry’s specific 
recommendation 20. Workload reductions were anticipated through parallel reforms of 
the death certification process involving local medical examiners overseen by a 
National Medical Examiner 22. When piloted this had reduced the proportion of 
coroner-referred deaths by 10% 23. However the possibility remained that the Charter 
might raise public expectations beyond the capabilities of the service 24, offering 
bereaved people “a list of laudable but unenforceable empty promises” 25 echoing 
experiences with the NHS Patients’ Charter 26.  By overstretching coroners’ staff and 
hampering any uptake of training there was a risk that standards might actually fall.  
2) Chief Coroner: 
A proposal to create the role of Chief Coroner presented a more affordable means of 
improving standards by liberating resources from wasteful bureaucracy. The intention 
was for a central leader to introduce consistency and transparency into the inquest 
service by streamlining functions, co-ordinating training and budgets, arbitrating over 
disputes, and standardising practice geographically. With a national overview of 
caseloads they would enhance technical efficiency (improved outcomes for a given 
cost) and allocative efficiency (redistributing resources to maximise outcomes) 27 , 
compensating in part for the failure to introduce central funding. These efficiencies 
would apply not only to the on-going functioning of the service but to the 
implementation of coronial reforms. Directing this overhaul would help achieve a 
major objective of the Coroners’ Bill – enhancing the capacity of coroners’ officers to 
provide or source support to bereaved people. Additionally by making all coroners 
accountable to the Chief Coroner autonomy from the government would be preserved.  
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Public health responsibilities were conferred on the Chief Coroner, for which 
autonomy was again essential. As a national figurehead they were expected to 
highlight coroners’ recommendations on preventing future deaths, including those 
implicating government departments. They were also required to engage with 
regulatory bodies on prevention of deaths and provide reports on shortcomings to 
Parliament. Finally there was an expectation that they would ensure more consistent 
recording of coroners’ verdicts, addressing the under-reporting of suicide 29. A non-
partisan figure such as a Chief Coroner would be best placed to redress this error, 
particularly where exposing any worsening of suicide rates would not be in the 
interests of government.  
3) Right of appeal:  
The proposal to introduce a right of appeal offered relatives the opportunity to contest 
a range of coroner’s decisions, including inquest verdicts. It was popular with 
bereaved people who felt it would encourage more thoughtful decision-making 30. The 
costs of this appeals system, estimated at £2.2 million per year 31, were to replace the 
expensive process of High Court applications and Judicial Review. However concerns 
were raised about affordability and the potential for uncontainable demand. There 
were also wider public health ramifications for the collection of suicide statistics. A 
decline in suicide verdicts was a distinct possibility, either as a consequence of 
appeals or to avoid them. This would necessitate the revision of statistical conventions 
on suicide data analysis, to maintain standards on accuracy of monitoring 32. Whilst 
aware of the potential to increase costs, bereaved people felt that this was justified by 
ensuring a fair and robust system 30.  
Consultation process 
Over the three years of consultation which followed the Bill’s publication coroners’ 
staff, police, local authorities, voluntary organisations, and bereaved people 
contributed to policy revisions. This resulted in the strengthening of an inquest’s 
impact through requiring implicated agencies to act on its recommendations 33 34, and 
the withdrawal of proposals threatening confidentiality of patient data 6. However 
media pressure ousted a reporting restrictions clause which would have protected 
relatives’ privacy in high-profile deaths, for example in cases of apparent suicide 35. 
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Overall stakeholder feedback praised the reforms’ plans to provide training, reduce 
caseloads, and improve efficiency 36 30, but there were consistent concerns about 
affordability. Whilst these were acknowledged by Ministers 37, at no stage were they 
actually addressed, and when the Act was passed in November 2009 there were 
already doubts about the feasibility of their implementation. 
The problem faced by any interested party appraising the Bill was that it lacked an 
accompanying economic analysis, balancing the expected costs, savings, benefits and 
harms of each coronial reform. Economic evaluation is a crucial component of 
evidence-based policy-making, helping identify the most efficient policies.  Given the 
wide-reaching potential impact of the reforms an appropriate analysis would have 
taken a societal perspective, quantifying the costs and benefits directly affecting the 
Ministry of Justice and those indirectly affecting bereaved people, other government 
departments, the voluntary sector, and society. Alternative scenarios could then be 
compared to each other, including comparisons to the ‘do nothing’ approach. Without 
such rational analysis it has been impossible to answer the fundamental questions in 
public spending: whether the additional efficiencies would balance any increased 
costs, and whether the potential benefits would justify any additional costs 38.  
Current state of play  
Progress with implementation has hardly moved on since the Act passed into law in 
2009. At that point consultation had started on the final drafting of the legislation, but 
coincided with the lead-up to a general election, as civil servants braced themselves 
for spending cuts. The outgoing Labour minister expressed fears for the reforms’ 
implementation, reminding politicians of their cross-party support 31. By May 2010 a 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government had been formed and 
immediately conducted a spending review to address the budget deficit. Newly-passed 
legislation was an obvious target, and civil servants were asked to review plans for 
coroner reforms 39. Further threats to their realisation loomed with the announcement 
of a ‘bonfire of the quangos’, including abolition of the office of the yet-to-be 
appointed Chief Coroner. This controversial decision, together with plans to shelve 
the appeals system and the National Medical Examiner, was justified on grounds of 
expense 7 but with no economic evaluation to delineate how the costs, savings and 
wider utilities of each position were balanced.  
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Pressure group INQUEST argued that this was a false economy 40, pronouncing that 
the reforms were “rendered completely hollow without the driving force and national 
leadership of a Chief Coroner” 25. Parliament’s Public Administration Select 
Committee agreed, arguing for a careful re-evaluation using an appropriate “value-
for-money test” 41. No economic evidence was forthcoming yet the proposals were 
fast-tracked for debate as part of the Public Bodies Bill 2010. Opposition arose from 
House of Lords peers who voted to protect the office of Chief Coroner, and the 
government responded with an apparent compromise. The current plan is to proceed 
with establishing a Chief Coroner’s office but to fragment its functions and transfer 
them to the Ministry of Justice 11. The very basic cost estimates provided lack any 
supporting analysis 42, and offer no evidence that the Ministry of Justice will perform 
these functions more cheaply or efficiently. Such an arrangement would also 
compromise the impartiality of the coronial system, in direct contravention of the 
Shipman report’s recommendations on autonomy 20. 
Meanwhile the pace of implementation of the remaining coronial reforms remains 
slow. Ministers have announced plans to move forward with “some of the (Act’s) 
measures”, including provision of information and support for bereaved people, 
training for coroners’ staff, and reducing bureaucracy 7. Their clear reliance on the 
voluntary sector again lacks any consideration of economic sustainability. 
Consultation has re-opened on the Charter for the Bereaved as part of plans to issue 
best practice guidance, and the coroners’ rules will also be updated. If the government 
succeed in their plan to subsume the Chief Coroner’s role it is unlikely that these 
documents will have much impact without the single, dedicated national leader 
empowered to implement grass-root changes. This reinforces the opposition’s 
assertion that abandoning plans for an independent Chief Coroner could “end up 






Failures of the two successive governments involved in coronial reform have 
contributed to this stasis. Both have neglected the crucial contribution of scientific 
evidence in policy-making 43, as a complement to the contribution of stakeholders 
12;24;30;31;36;37, and expert opinion 19;20. Whilst the Labour government took care to 
counsel stakeholder opinion it failed to conduct the necessary economic evaluations. 
The coalition government’s response to the public deficit may indeed be an attempt to 
limit wasteful bureaucracy, but without any explicit evaluation their approach risks 
sacrificing potential cost savings 31. The coroner reforms announced in 2006 reflected 
the value placed on consumer protection and service efficiency 24. There is still an 
opportunity to realise at least some of the benefits originally intended, provided that 
the debate is informed by appropriate economic evaluation, and that the approach 
chosen provides a sufficiently wide perspective.  
To move forward the government must set-out a clear matrix of direct and indirect 
costs, savings, utility gains and losses for each proposal, so that detailed economic 
evaluations can be conducted. INQUEST highlights the broad scope that should be 
taken, including costs to the NHS in managing the impact of delays on bereaved 
families’ physical and mental health, costs to the justice system in reviewing 
coroners’ decisions, and costs within the inquest service in investigating preventable 
deaths where failings had been ignored 42. The next stage would be a comparison of 
alternative scenarios, including a reconsideration of centralised funding and its impact 
on allocative efficiency within the coroners’ service. Similarly a comparison of 
proposals for a Chief Coroner’s office would seek to balance economies of scale 
against autonomy losses and any other direct and indirect utilities.  
The outcome of this series of comparisons would be a ranking of proposals by cost-
utility ratios;  a comprehensive, systematic and explicit process to assist in decision-
making 38. Whilst such rankings would only be a guide to prioritisation, they would 
reduce the chances of human subjectivity dominating over scientific evidence, as has 
characterised the process of coronial reform to date. Once decisions are made over 
priority areas for implementation the process of secondary legislation can then 
commence, reaching agreement over any new rules and regulations governing their 
day-to-day operation. This whole process brings rationality into decision-making over 
social welfare, countering vested interests and giving scientific analysis its due 
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weight. It might finally provide a means of translating evidence-based policy into 
practice, and delivering some proportion of the intended benefits for bereaved people, 
government agencies, and society. 
Conclusion 
The coronial reforms enacted in 2009 had wide cost and utility implications. The 
rational and comprehensive process of economic evaluation forms part of a 
government’s fiscal responsibilities in allocating scarce public resources, but has been 
lacking in decision-making over coronial reform. This has contributed to a 2-year 
stalemate involving much political wrangling. To prevent such situations from arising 
in the future, while also meeting the requirement for prudent public spending, policy 
makers are urged to use explicit economic evaluation in all such decision-making. 
Although this has been absent from coronial reforms, it is hoped that the imminent 
appointment of a Chief Coroner will bring about many of the benefits originally 
intended for bereaved people, coroners’ staff, wider government departments, public 
health and society.  
Footnote:  
Details in this article were correct at the time of going to press (15 November 2011). 
Updates are available on the UK Parliament website 
(http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-11/publicbodieshl.html) and on the 
INQUEST website (www.inquest.org.uk). Legislative documents on the coroners’ 
service and coroner reform are downloadable from the Ministry of Justice website 
(www.justice.gov.uk), with additional publications available on the UK Parliament 
website (www.parliament.uk). For further information, listen to BBC Radio 4’s 
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